The RMS
Titanic was the largest
passenger steamship in the world when she set off on her maiden voyage from Southampton, England, on 10 April
1912. Four days into the trip, on 14 April 1912, she struck an iceberg and sank, resulting in the deaths of 1,517
people in one of the deadliest peacetime maritime
disasters in history.
An Olympic-class passenger liner, the Titanic was
owned by the White Star
Line and constructed at the Harland and Wolff shipyard in Belfast, Ireland (now Northern Ireland).
She set sail for New York
City with 2,223 people on board; the high casualty rate when the ship sank
was due in part to the fact that, although complying with the regulations of the
time, the ship carried lifeboats for only 1,178 people. A disproportionate
number of men died due to the women and children first
protocol that was followed. The Titanic was built at the Harland and Wolff shipyard in Belfast, and designed to compete with the rival Cunard Line's Lusitania and Mauretania. The Titanic,
along with her Olympic-class sisters, the Olympic and the soon-to-be-built Britannic (which
was to be called Gigantic at first), were intended to be the largest,
most luxurious ships ever to operate. The designers were Lord Pirrie,
a director of both
Harland and Wolff and White Star, naval architect Thomas Andrews, Harland and
Wolff's construction manager and head of their design department, and Alexander
Carlisle, the shipyard's chief draughtsman and general manager.Carlisle's
responsibilities included the decorations, the equipment and all general
arrangements, including the implementation of an efficient lifeboat davit design. Carlisle would leave the
project in 1910, before the ships were launched, when he became a shareholder in
Welin Davit & Engineering
Company Ltd, the firm making the davits.
Construction of the RMS Titanic, funded by the American J.P. Morgan
and his International Mercantile Marine
Co., began on 31 March 1909. The Titanic's hull was launched on 31 May 1911, and her
outfitting was completed by 31 March the following year. Her length overall was
882 feet 9 inches (269.1 m), the moulded breadth 92 feet 0 inches (28.0 m),
the
tonnage 46,328 GRT, and the height from the water line
to the boat deck of 59 feet (18 m). She was equipped with two reciprocating
four-cylinder,
triple-expansion steam
engines and one low-pressure Parsons turbine, which combined drove three propellers. There were 29 boilers
fired by 159 coal burning furnaces that made possible a top speed of 23 knots
(43 km/h; 26 mph). Only three of the four 62 feet (19 m) funnels were functional:
the fourth, which served only for ventilation purposes, was added to make the
ship look more impressive. The ship could carry a total of 3,547 passengers and
crew.
For her maiden voyage, Titanic carried a total of 20 lifeboats of
three different varieties:
The lifeboats were predominantly stowed in chocks on the boat deck, not
connected to the falls of the davits. All of the lifeboats, including the
collapsibles, were placed on the ship by the giant gantry crane at Belfast.
Those on the starboard side were numbered 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13 and 15 from
bow-to-stern, while those on the port side were numbered 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14
and 16 from bow-to-stern. The emergency cutters (lifeboats 1 and 2) were kept
swung out, hanging from the davits, ready for immediate use while collapsible
lifeboats C and D were stowed on the boat deck immediately in-board of boats 1
and 2 respectively. Collapsible lifeboats A and B were stored on the roof of the
officers' quarters, on either side of number 1 funnel. However there were no
davits mounted on the officers' quarters to lower collapsibles A and B and the
both of them weighed a considerable amount empty. During the sinking, lowering
collapsibles A and B proved difficult as it was first necessary to slide the
boats on timbers and/or oars down to the boat deck. During this procedure,
collapsible B capsized and subsequently floated off the ship upside down.
At the design stage Carlisle suggested that the Titanic use a new,
larger type of davit, manufactured by the
Welin Davit & Engineering Co Ltd, each of which could handle four lifeboats.
Sixteen sets of these davits were installed, giving the Titanic the
ability to carry 64 wooden lifeboats—a
total capacity of over 4,000 people, compared with the Titanic's total carrying capacity of about 3,600
passengers and crew. However, the White Star Line, while agreeing to the new
davits, decided that only 16 wooden lifeboats (16 being the minimum required by
the Board of Trade,
based on the Titanic's projected
tonnage) would be carried (there were also four folding lifeboats, called
collapsibles), which could accommodate only 1,178 people (33% of the
Titanic's total capacity). At
the time, the Board of Trade's regulations stated that British vessels over
10,000 tons must carry 16 lifeboats with a capacity of 5,500 cubic feet (160 m3),
plus enough capacity in rafts and floats for 75% (or 50% in case of a vessel
with watertight bulkheads) of that in the lifeboats. Therefore, the White Star
Line actually provided more lifeboat accommodation than was legally
required.
The regulations had made no extra provision for larger ships since 1894, when
the largest passenger ship under consideration was the Cunard Line's Lucania, only 13,000 tons.
Sir Alfred Chalmers, nautical adviser to the Board of Trade from 1896 to 1911,
had considered the matter "from time to time", but because he thought that
experienced sailors would have to be carried "uselessly" aboard ship for no
other purpose than lowering and manning lifeboats, and the difficulty he
anticipated in getting away a greater number than 16 in any emergency, he "did
not consider it necessary to increase [our scale]".
Carlisle told the official inquiry that he had discussed the matter with J. Bruce Ismay, White
Star's Managing Director, but in his evidence Ismay denied that he had ever
heard of this, nor did he recollect noticing such provision in the plans of the
ship he had inspected. Ten days
before the maiden voyage Axel
Welin, the maker of the Titanic's lifeboat davits, had announced that his
machinery had been installed because the vessel's owners were aware of
forthcoming changes in official regulations, but Harold Sanderson,
vice-president of the International Mercantile Marine and former general manager
of the White Star Line, denied that this had been the intention
On the night of Sunday, 14 April 1912, the temperature had dropped to near
freezing and the ocean was calm. The moon was not visible (being two days before
new moon), and the sky was clear. Captain Smith, in response to iceberg warnings received via wireless over the preceding few days, had drawn up a
new course which took the ship slightly further southward. That Sunday at
13:45, a
message from the steamer Amerika warned that large icebergs lay in the
Titanic's path, but as Jack Phillips and Harold
Bride, the Marconi wireless radio operators, were employed by Marconi
and paid to relay
messages to and from the passengers, they were not
focused on relaying such "non-essential" ice messages to the bridge.
Later that
evening, another report of numerous large icebergs, this time from the
Mesaba, also failed to reach the bridge.
At 23:40, while sailing about 400 miles south of the Grand Banks of Newfoundland,
lookouts Fredrick Fleet and Reginald Lee spotted a large iceberg directly
ahead of the ship. Fleet sounded the ship's bell three times and telephoned the
bridge exclaiming, "Iceberg, right ahead!". First Officer Murdoch gave the order
"hard-a-starboard", using the traditional tiller order for an abrupt turn to port (left), and
adjusted the engines (he either ordered through the telegraph
for "full reverse" or "stop" on the engines; survivor testimony on this
conflicts).[40][41][42] The
iceberg brushed the ship's starboard side (right side), buckling the hull in
several places and popping out rivets
below the waterline over a length of 299 feet (90 m). As seawater filled the
forward compartments, the watertight doors shut. However, while the ship could
stay afloat with four flooded compartments, five were filling with water. The
five water-filled compartments weighed down the ship so that the tops of the
forward watertight bulkheads fell below the ship's waterline, allowing water to
pour into additional compartments. Captain Smith, alerted by the jolt of the
impact, arrived on the bridge and ordered a full stop. Shortly after midnight on
15 April, following an inspection by the ship's officers and Thomas Andrews, the
lifeboats
were ordered to be readied and a distress call was sent out.
Wireless operators Jack
Phillips and Harold Bride were busy sending out CQD, the international distress signal. Several
ships responded, including Mount Temple, Frankfurt and
Titanic's sister ship,
Olympic, but none was close enough to make it in time. The
closest ship to respond was Cunard Line's Carpathia 58 miles (93 km) away, which
could arrive in an estimated four hours—too late to rescue all of the
Titanic's passengers. The only
land–based location that received the distress call from Titanic was a wireless station at Cape Race, Newfoundland.
From the bridge, the lights of a nearby ship could be seen off the port side.
The identity of this ship remains a mystery but there have been theories
suggesting that it was probably either the SS Californian or a sealer called the
Sampson. As it was not
responding to wireless, Fourth Officer Boxhall and Quartermaster Rowe
attempted signalling the ship with a Morse lamp and later with distress rockets, but the
ship never appeared to respond. The Californian, which
was nearby and stopped for the night because of ice, also saw lights in the
distance. The Californian's
wireless was turned off, and the wireless operator had gone to bed for the
night. Just before he went to bed at around 23:00 the Californian's radio operator attempted to warn the
Titanic that there was ice ahead, but he was cut off by an exhausted Jack
Phillips, who had fired back an angry response, "Shut up, shut up, I am busy; I
am working Cape Race", referring to the Newfoundland wireless station.
When the
Californian's officers first saw
the ship, they tried signalling her with their Morse lamp, but also never
appeared to receive a response. Later, they noticed the Titanic's distress signals over the lights and
informed Captain Stanley
Lord. Even though there was much discussion about the mysterious ship, which
to the officers on duty appeared to be moving away, the master of the
Californian did not wake her wireless operator until morning.
The first lifeboat launched was Lifeboat 7 on the starboard side with 28 people on board out of a
capacity of 65. It was lowered at around 00:40 as believed by the British
Inquiry. Lifeboat
6 and Lifeboat 5 were launched ten minutes later. Lifeboat 1 was the fifth
lifeboat to be launched with 12 people. Lifeboat 11 was overloaded with 70
people. Collapsible D was the last lifeboat to be launched. The Titanic
carried 20 lifeboats with a total capacity of 1,178 people. While not enough to
hold all of the passengers and crew, the Titanic carried more boats than
was required by the British Board of Trade Regulations. At the time, the number
of lifeboats required was determined by a ship's gross register tonnage, rather
than her human capacity.
The Titanic was given ample stability and sank with only a few degrees list,
the design being such that there was very little risk of unequal flooding and
possible capsize. Furthermore the electric power plant was operated by the ship's engineers until
the end. Hence Titanic showed no outward signs of being in imminent
danger, and passengers were reluctant to leave the apparent safety of the ship
to board small lifeboats. Large numbers of Third Class passengers were unable to
reach the lifeboat deck through unfamiliar parts of the ship and past barriers,
although some stewards such as William Denton Cox successfully led some
groups from Third Class to the lifeboats. As a result, most
of the boats were launched partially empty; one boat meant to hold 40 people
left the Titanic with only 12 people on board. With "Women and children first" the
imperative for loading lifeboats, Second Officer Lightoller, who was loading
boats on the port side, allowed men to board only if oarsmen were needed, even if there was
room. First Officer Murdoch, who was loading boats on the starboard side, let
men on board if women were absent. As the ship's list increased people started
to become nervous, and some lifeboats began leaving fully loaded. By 02:05, the
entire bow was under water,
and all the lifeboats, except for two, had been launched.
Around 02:10, the stern rose out of the
water exposing the propellers, and
by 02:17 the waterline had reached the boat deck. The last two lifeboats floated
off the deck, collapsible B upside down, collapsible A half-filled with water
after the supports for its canvas sides were broken in the fall from the roof of
the officers' quarters. Shortly afterwards, the forward funnel collapsed,
crushing part of the bridge and people in the water. On deck, people were
scrambling towards the stern or jumping overboard in hopes of reaching a
lifeboat. The ship's stern slowly rose into the air, and everything unsecured
crashed towards the water. While the stern rose, the electrical system finally
failed and the lights went out. Shortly afterwards, the stress on the hull
caused the Titanic to break apart between the last two funnels, and the
bow went completely under. The stern righted itself slightly and then rose
vertically. After a few moments, at 02:20, this too sank into the ocean.
Only two of the 18 launched lifeboats rescued people after the ship sank.
Lifeboat 4 was close by and picked up five people, two of whom later died. Close
to an hour later, lifeboat 14 went back and rescued four people, one of whom
died afterwards. Other people managed to climb onto the lifeboats that floated
off the deck. There were some arguments in some of the other lifeboats about
going back, but many survivors were afraid of being swamped by people trying to
climb into the lifeboat or being pulled down by the suction from the sinking the
Titanic, though it turned out that there had been very little
suction.
As the ship fell into the depths, the two sections behaved very differently.
The streamlined bow planed off approximately 2,000 feet (609 m) below the
surface and slowed somewhat, landing relatively gently. The stern plunged
violently to the ocean floor, the hull being torn apart along the way from
massive implosions caused by compression
of the air still trapped inside. The stern smashed into the bottom at
considerable speed, grinding the hull deep into the silt.
After steaming at 17.5 knots for just under four hours, the RMS
Carpathia arrived in the area and at 04:10 began rescuing survivors. By
08:30 she picked up the last lifeboat with survivors and left the area at
08:50 bound for New
York
Before the survivors even arrived in New York, investigations were being
planned to discover what had happened, and what could be done to prevent a
recurrence. The United States Senate initiated an inquiry
into the disaster on 19 April, a day after the Carpathia arrived in New
York.
The chairman of the inquiry, Senator William Alden Smith, wanted to gather
accounts from passengers and crew while the events were still fresh in their
minds. Smith also needed to subpoena
the British citizens while they were still on American soil. This prevented all
surviving passengers and crew from returning to the UK before the American inquiry, which lasted until
25 May, was completed.
Lord Mersey was
appointed to head the British Board of Trade's inquiry into the
disaster. The British inquiry took place between 2 May and 3 July. Each inquiry
took testimony from both passengers and crew of the Titanic, crew members
of Leyland Line's Californian, Captain Arthur Rostron of the
Carpathia and other experts.
The investigations found that many safety rules were simply out of date, and
new laws were recommended. Numerous safety improvements for ocean-going vessels
were implemented, including improved hull and bulkhead design, access throughout
the ship for egress of passengers, lifeboat requirements, improved life-vest
design, the holding of safety drills, better passenger notification, radio
communications laws, etc. The investigators also learned that the Titanic
had sufficient lifeboat space for all first-class
passengers, but not for the lower classes. In fact, most third class passengers had no idea where the lifeboats
were, much less any way of getting up to the higher decks where the lifeboats
were stowed.
Both inquiries into the disaster found that the SS Californian and her captain, Stanley Lord, failed to give
proper assistance to the Titanic. Testimony before the inquiry revealed
that at 22:10, the Californian observed the lights of a ship to the
south; it was later agreed between Captain Lord and Third Officer C.V. Groves (who had relieved Lord of
duty at 22:10) that this was a passenger liner. The Californian had
warned the ship by radio of the pack ice because of which the Californian
had stopped for the night, but was violently rebuked by the Titanic's senior wireless operator, Jack Phillips. At 23:50,
the officer had watched this ship's lights flash out, as if the ship had shut
down or turned sharply, and that the port light was now observed. Morse light
signals to the ship, upon Lord's order, occurred five times between 23:30 and
01:00, but were not acknowledged. (In testimony, it was stated that the
Californian's Morse lamp had a
range of about four miles (6 km), so could not have been seen from the
Titanic.)
Captain Lord had retired at 23:30; however, Second
Officer Herbert Stone, now on duty, notified Lord at 01:15 that the ship had
fired a rocket, followed by four more. Lord wanted to know if they were company
signals, that is, coloured flares used for identification. Stone said that he
did not know and that the rockets were all white. Captain Lord instructed the
crew to continue to signal the other vessel with the Morse lamp, and went back
to sleep. Three more rockets were observed at 01:50 and Stone noted that the
ship looked strange in the water, as if she were listing. At 02:15, Lord was
notified that the ship could no longer be seen. Lord asked again if the lights
had had any colours in them, and he was informed that they were all white.
The Californian eventually responded. At 05:30, Chief Officer George
Stewart awakened wireless operator Cyril Evans, informed him that rockets had been
seen during the night, and asked that he try to communicate with any ships. The
Frankfurt notified the operator of the Titanic's loss, Captain Lord was notified, and the
ship set out for assistance.
The inquiries found that the Californian was much closer to the
Titanic than the 19.5 miles (31.4 km) that Captain Lord had believed and
that Lord should have awakened the wireless operator after the rockets were
first reported to him, and thus could have acted to prevent loss of life.
In 1990, following the discovery of the wreck, the Marine Accident Investigation
Branch of the British Department of Transport re-opened the inquiry to
review the evidence relating to the Californian. Its report of 1992
concluded that the Californian was farther from the Titanic than
the earlier British inquiry had found, and that the distress rockets, but not
the Titanic herself, would have been visible from the Californian.
It is well established that the sinking of the Titanic was the result
of an iceberg collision which fatally punctured the ship's front five watertight
compartments. Less obvious however are the reasons for the collision itself
(which occurred on a clear night, and after the ship had received numerous ice
warnings), the factors underlying the sheer extent of the damage sustained by
the ship, and the reasons for the extreme loss of life.
Originally, historians thought the iceberg had cut a gash into the
Titanic's hull. Since the part
of the ship that the iceberg damaged is now buried, scientists used sonar to examine the area and discovered the
iceberg had caused the hull to buckle, allowing water to enter Titanic
between her steel plates.
The steel plate used for the Titanic hull was of 1 to 1½ inch (2.5 to
3.8 cm) thickness. A detailed
analysis of small pieces of the steel plating from the Titanic's wreck hull found that it was of a
metallurgy that loses its ductility and becomes brittle in cold or icy water, leaving it
vulnerable to dent-induced ruptures. The pieces of steel were found to have very
high content of phosphorus and
sulphur (4× and 2×
respectively, compared with modern steel), with manganese-sulphur ratio of 6.8:1 (compared with over
200:1 ratio for modern steels). High content of phosphorus initiates fractures,
sulphur forms grains of iron sulphide that facilitate propagation of cracks, and
lack of manganese makes the steel less ductile. The recovered samples were found
to be undergoing ductile-brittle transition in
temperatures of 90 °F (32 °C) for longitudinal samples and 133 °F (56 °C) for
transversal samples, compared with transition temperature of −17 °F (−27 °C)
common for modern steels: modern steel would only become so brittle in between
−76 °F and −94 °F (−60 °C and −70 °C). The Titanic's steel, although "probably the best plain
carbon ship plate available at the time", was thus unsuitable for use at low
temperatures. The anisotropy was probably caused by
hot
rolling influencing the orientation of the sulphide stringer
(defect) inclusions. The steel was probably produced in the acid-lined,
open-hearth furnaces in Glasgow, which
would explain the high content of phosphorus and sulphur, even for the time.
Another factor was the rivets holding the hull together, which were much more
fragile than once thought.[108][109] From 48 rivets
recovered from the hull of the Titanic, scientists found many to be
riddled with high concentrations of slag. A
glassy residue of smelting, slag can make rivets brittle and prone to fracture.
Records from the archive of the builder show that the ship's builder ordered No.
3 iron bar, known as "best"—not No. 4, known as "best-best", for its rivets,
although shipbuilders at that time typically used No. 4 iron for rivets. The
company also had shortages of skilled riveters, particularly important for hand
riveting, which took great skill: the iron had to be heated to a precise colour
and shaped by the right combination of hammer blows. The company used steel
rivets, which were stronger and could be installed by machine, on the central
hull, where stresses were expected to be greatest, using iron rivets for the
stern and bow. Rivets of "best best" iron had a tensile strength approximately 80% of that of
steel, "best" iron some 73%. Despite this,
the most extensive and finally fatal damage the Titanic sustained, at
boiler rooms No. 5 and 6, was done in an area where steel rivets were used.
Although the Titanic's rudder met the mandated dimensional
requirements for a ship her size, the rudder's design was hardly
state-of-the-art. According to research by BBC
History: "Her stern, with its high graceful counter and long thin rudder,
was an exact copy of an 18th-century sailing ship... a perfect example of the
lack of technical development. Compared with the rudder design of the Cunarders,
the Titanic's was a fraction of
the size. No account was made for advances in scale and little thought was given
to how a ship, 852 feet in length, might turn in an emergency or avoid collision with
an iceberg. This was the Titanic's Achilles heel."
A more objective
assessment of the rudder provision compares it with the legal requirement of the
time: the area had to be within a range of 1.5% and 5% of the hull's underwater
profile and, at 1.9%, the Titanic was at the low end of the range.
However, the tall rudder design was more effective at the vessel's designed
cruising speed; short, square rudders were more suitable for low-speed
manoeuvring.
Perhaps more fatal to the design of the Titanic was her triple screw
engine configuration, which had reciprocating steam engines driving her wing
propellers, and a steam turbine driving her centre propeller. The reciprocating
engines were reversible, while the turbine was not. According to subsequent
evidence from Fourth Officer Joseph Boxhall, who entered the bridge just
after the collision, First Officer Murdoch had set the engine room
telegraph to reverse the engines to avoid the iceberg, thus
handicapping the turning ability of the ship. Because the centre turbine could
not reverse during the "full speed astern" manoeuvre, it was simply stopped.
Since the centre propeller was positioned forward of the ship's rudder, the
effectiveness of that rudder would have been greatly reduced: had Murdoch simply
turned the ship while maintaining her forward speed, the Titanic might
have missed the iceberg with metres to spare. Another
survivor, Frederick Scott, an engine room worker, gave contrary evidence: he
recalled that at his station in the engine room all four sets of telegraphs had
changed to "Stop", but not until after the collision.
It has been speculated that the ship could have been saved if she had rammed
the iceberg head on.
It is hypothesised that if Titanic had not altered her course at all and
instead collided head first with the iceberg, the impact would have been taken
by the naturally stronger bow and damage would have affected only one or two
forward compartments. This would have disabled her, and possibly caused
casualties among the passengers near the bow, but probably would not have
resulted in sinking since Titanic was designed to float with the first
four compartments flooded. Instead, the glancing blow to the starboard side
caused buckling in the hull plates along the first five compartments, more than
the ship's designers had anticipated.
The weather conditions for the Atlantic at the time of the collision were
unusual because there was a flat calm sea, without wind or swell. In addition,
it was a moonless night. Under normal sea conditions in the area of the
collision, waves would have broken over the base of an iceberg, assisting in the
location of icebergs even on a moonless night.
The conclusion of the British Inquiry into the sinking was “that the loss of
the said ship was due to collision with an iceberg, brought about by the
excessive speed at which the ship was being navigated”. At the time of the
collision it is thought that the Titanic was at her normal cruising speed
of about 22 knots, which was less than her top speed of around 24 knots. At the
time it was common (but not universal) practice to maintain normal speed in
areas where icebergs were expected. It was thought that any iceberg large enough
to damage the ship would be seen in sufficient time to be avoided.
No single aspect regarding the huge loss of life from the Titanic
disaster has provoked more outrage than the fact that the ship did not carry
enough lifeboats for all her passengers and crew. This is partially due to the
fact that the law, dating from 1894, required a minimum of 16 lifeboats for
ships of over 10,000 tons. This law had been established when the largest ship
afloat was RMS
Lucania. Since then the size of ships had increased rapidly, meaning
that Titanic was legally required to carry only enough lifeboats for less
than half of its capacity. Actually, the White Star Line exceeded the
regulations by including four more collapsible lifeboats—this gave a total
capacity of 1,178 people (still only around a third of the Titanic's total capacity of 3,547).
In the busy North Atlantic sea lanes it was expected that in the event of a
serious accident to a ship, help from other vessels would be quickly obtained,
and that the lifeboats would be used to ferry passengers and crew from the
stricken vessel to its rescuers. Full provision of lifeboats was not considered
necessary for this.
It was anticipated during the design of the ship that the British Board of
Trade might require an increase in the number of lifeboats at some future date.
Therefore lifeboat davits capable of handling up to four boats per pair of
davits were designed and installed, to give a total potential capacity of 64
boats. The additional
boats were never fitted. It is often alleged that J. Bruce Ismay, the President of White Star,
vetoed the installation of these additional boats to maximise the passenger
promenade area on the boat deck. Harold Sanderson, Vice President of
International Merchantile Marine, rejected this allegation during the British
Inquiry.
The lack of lifeboats was not the only cause of the tragic loss of lives.
After the collision with the iceberg, one hour was taken to evaluate the damage,
recognise what was going to happen, inform first class passengers, and lower the
first lifeboat. Afterward, the crew worked quite efficiently, taking a total of
80 minutes to lower all 16 lifeboats. Since the crew was divided into two teams,
one on each side of the ship, an average of 10 minutes of work was necessary for
a team to fill a lifeboat with passengers and lower it.
Yet another factor in the high death toll that related to the lifeboats was
the initial reluctance of the passengers to board them. The most notable being
Lifeboat #1 with a capacity of 40, launched at 00:40 with only 12 people aboard.
This was partly due to at the point of launch, Titanic did not appear to be in
imminent danger and hence passengers were likely to be reluctant to leave the apparent safety of the ship. The idea that the
ship was unsinkable is unlikely to be the reason of
the low utilisation of early life boats
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